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Abstract
The present paper takes a look at the particularities of German strategy research over the last three
decades. In contrast to much of the Anglo-Saxon research, which has focused on competition as a
guiding concept in theorizing about strategy, German research has typically been concerned with more
fundamental questions about the general relationship between organizations and their environments and,
as a result, tended to be more conceptual than empirical. Researchers have been particularly influenced
by the German sociological and philosophical traditions, specifically by the critical theory of Jürgen
Habermas and by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Also, there are authors who draw on the
economic tradition of the Austrian School in order to develop a competence-based theory of the firm.
Another branch builds on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory and Jacques Derrida's philosophy of
deconstruction. As we will demonstrate, much of the research has been concerned with fundamental
theoretical tensions: evolution vs. planning, selection vs. compensation, cognitive-instrumental
rationality vs. moral-practical rationality, etc. We note that, as a consequence, much of German strategy
research shows a particular interest in paradoxa and oxymora (such as ‘planned evolution', ‘productive
misunderstandings' or ‘unfocused monitoring'). This paper will identify and explore important strands of
German strategy research and discuss its particularities compared to mainstream strategy research in the
United States.
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Abstract: 
The present paper takes a look at the particularities of German strategy research over the last 
three decades. In contrast to much of the Anglo-Saxon research, which has focused on 
competition as a guiding concept in theorizing about strategy, German research has typically 
been concerned with more fundamental questions about the general relation between 
organizations and their environments and, as a result, tended to be more conceptual than 
empirical. Researchers have been particularly influenced by the German sociological and 
philosophical theoretical traditions, specifically by the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas and 
by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Also, there are authors who draw on the economic 
tradition of the Austrian school in order to develop a competence-based theory of the firm. 
Another branch builds on Anthony Giddens‘s structuration theory and Jacques Derrida‘s 
philosophy of deconstruction. As we will demonstrate, much of the research has been 
concerned with fundamental theoretical tensions: evolution vs. planning, selection vs. 
compensation, cognitive-instrumental rationality vs. moral-practical rationality etc. We note 
that, as a consequence, much of German strategy research shows a particular interest in 
paradoxa and oxymora (such as ―planned evolution‖, ―productive misunderstandings‖ or 
―unfocused monitoring‖). This paper will identify and explore important strands of German 
strategy research and discuss its particularities compared to mainstream strategy research in 
the US. 
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Introduction 
 
While the historical development of strategic management can be traced back to the Old 
Testament and even beyond that (Bracker 1980), its relation to business organizations 
originates in the second half of the 20th century (Mintzberg 1990, Knights and Morgan 1991, 
Knyphausen 1995). After the Second World War, corporations – particularly in the US – were 
confronted with a new situation: their originally stable and predictable environments started to 
become increasingly competitive and turbulent (Ansoff 1969). This required a new approach 
to the management of organizations and as a result the passive administrators at the top turned 
into proactive strategists. As Knights and Morgan (1991) show, this development was driven 
very much by academic writers in the US (e.g. Ansoff 1965, Learned et al. 1965, Andrews 
1971, Uyterhoven et al. 1977, Hofer and Schendel 1978) calling for strategic management as 
a response to the new environmental challenges. The legendary conference at the University 
of Pittsburg on ―Business Policy and Planning: The State of the Art‖ (Schendel and Hofer 
1979) marked the establishment of strategic management as a separate field in its own right. 
Against this background, strategic management – both as a particular field of practice and as 
an academic discipline – can be characterized as an originally North American phenomenon. 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s strategic management started to spread also to other countries, 
including Germany (e.g. Hinterhuber 1977, Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft 1977, Steinmann 
1981). Yet, the academic context in which the US research was received at that time was 
somewhat different from that in the US. Three aspects appear particularly important in this 
respect: first, the structure of the academic system that is peculiar to German universities – the 
Lehrstuhl system, where each ―professor is a ‗department‘ in his or her own right‖ (Clark 
1983, Meister-Scheytt and Scott 2009, p. 55). In practice, this meant that professors had to 
cover entire academic fields (e.g. organization studies, human resource management, or 
accounting) both in research and teaching (Muller-Camen and Salzgeber 2005). Typically, 
professors were called to prove their command of the entire field through their 
Habilitationsschrift (a lengthy post-doctoral thesis) prior to being appointed to a full 
professorship (Meister-Scheytt and Scott 2009, p. 55). As a result of these peculiarities, the 
scope of research and respective theoretical frameworks of German professors generally 
tended to be broader than those of their American counterparts (for an overview, see Gaugler 
and Köhler 2002). This was reflected in the tendency of German professors to publish 
predominantly books rather than isolated articles. These frameworks were often developed 
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across generations of researchers who formed schools around eminent scholars (e.g. Edmund 
Heinen, Hans Ulrich, Werner Kirsch, Horst Steinmann). On the whole, management research 
in Germany at the time was characterized by more holistic approaches covering all aspects of 
management (e.g. Kirsch 1973). 
 
Second, it has been pointed out (Galtung 1979, 1981) that there are fundamental differences 
between the approach to social science in German academia (the ―Teutonic intellectual style‖) 
and that prevalent in other countries (including the US): the ideal-type ―Teutonic‖ approach to 
research is conceptual rather than empirical and is aimed at grand rather than mid-range 
theories, also, theoretical developments tend to be ―deduced‖ from central principles 
(Knyphausen 1995). In addition, Teutonic research is particularly concerned with ―paradigm 
analysis‖, i.e. ―looking into the foundations of what one does, of exploring the limitations of 
one‘s own intellectual enterprise‖ (Galtung 1981, p. 821). This particular intellectual style 
might be partly a result of, or at least supported by, the way in which the German Lehrstuhl 
system was traditionally understood – and still is at some universities: until recently university 
professors were typically expected to build their reputation by developing overarching 
conceptual frameworks that would guide the subsequent work of their (often quite large) 
entourage of research assistants. The assistants themselves – being largely dependent on their 
professor (Clark 1983) – would typically be expected to develop these frameworks further or 
apply them to concrete issues or problems (as part of their PhD theses or postdoctoral 
research), until they qualified for being appointed to a chair in their turn, after which they 
could go on to develop their own conceptual frameworks (Muller-Camen and Salzberger 
2005). 
 
Third, the reputation in the international academic community tended to be much less 
important to German management scholars than that in the national community (Muller-
Camen and Salzgeber 2005, p. 277) with promotions being based primarily on the evaluation 
of publications in German journals (Schlinghoff 2001). This was supported by the particular 
university system according to which PhD theses and post-doctoral theses 
[Habilitationsschrift] were typically supervised and examined by the professors at the 
respective university (Muller-Camen and Salzgeber 2005). Hence, while there was an intense 
debate on management issues among German researchers, until the middle of the 1990s there 
is little evidence of any exchange of ideas between German academics and academics from 
other countries (Simon 1993, Muller 1999). There were, of course, some exceptions, where 
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researchers actively sought to publish their work internationally (e.g. Schreyögg and 
Steinmann 1987), however it received little attention by US researchers. Consequently, while 
German researchers tended to pick up on research published (in English) outside Germany, 
their own research received little international attention, not least because it was 
predominantly published in German. 
 
Against this background the present paper aims to point out aspects that have been peculiar to 
German strategy research over the last three decades, and which distinguish it clearly from 
mainstream research in the US. This study is in line with earlier work that examined the 
particularities of European strategy research (e.g. McGee and Thomas 1986, Snow 1986). 
However, so far the particularities of strategy research in Germany have not been 
systematically examined – with the notable exception of Knyphausen (1995), who touched on 
this question in his book on the state-of-the-art of strategy research in the mid 1990s.  
 
Given the circumstances in which German strategy research developed (including many 
aspects not covered here – e.g. the particularities of German management practice, described 
in Knyphausen 1995) – perhaps it is not surprising to find that, at least initially, there were 
some significant differences between Germany and the US with relation to how strategy 
research was conducted. German strategy researchers were aware of strategy research in 
North America (Knyphausen 1995, p. 263) but tended not to build on it directly. Instead, they 
often integrated it into their own theoretical frameworks. Since very little of that (German) 
research found its way back into US academia, Germany and the US followed – at least 
initially – quite separate discourses. Certainly, over the last few years things have changed 
considerably in Germany – researchers are getting actively involved in the international 
discourse, the ―Saxonic intellectual style‖ (Galtung 1981) is taking hold in Germany as well, 
and the old Lehrstuhl system is beginning to get dismantled. As such, the differences between 
the two strategy discourses are becoming less prominent and the number of more mainstream, 
US-style contributions by German researchers is increasing. Nevertheless, the differences are 
still visible in much of the current research. 
 
In order to identify the particular characteristics of German strategy research we will take a 
closer look at the important streams of strategy research in Germany, as they developed over 
the last three decades. We will focus on those research endeavours that can be seen as 
substantial contributions to the strategy discourse. While our approach yields inevitably a 
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somewhat rough selection, and certainly does not do justice to all noteworthy works in the 
field, it is nevertheless useful for identifying the aspects that characterize the central streams 
of research activity. As we will show, the principal contributions to strategy research in 
Germany tend to cluster around particular theoretical perspectives, primarily, prominent 
sociological and philosophical theories. Of course, not all works fall into these clusters but 
such exceptions tend to constitute smaller, individual research projects. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured into seven sections. The next five sections will present 
important streams of strategy research in Germany, which have formed around five particular 
theoretical perspectives. We start with the two most prominent ones: the perspective 
associated with the Munich School of Strategic Management draws on the works of Jürgen 
Habermas, while that of the Steinmann-Schreyögg School grew out of the ideas of Niklas 
Luhmann. We will then present the three smaller and more recent streams of research, which 
draw on the Austrian School, Giddens‘s structuration theory and Derrida‘s theory of 
deconstruction respectively. After that, we will point out the particularities of these streams of 
research, which differentiate them from North American mainstream research. We conclude 
with a brief section, in which we reflect on this paper‘s main contribution to the existing body 
of research. 
 
2. Jürgen Habermas and the “Munich School of Strategic Management” 
 
Probably the most eminent proponent of strategy research in the German context is Werner 
Kirsch at the University of Munich, the leading figure of the so-called ―Munich School of 
Strategic Management‖, which has even published its own book series, comprising more than 
one hundred volumes. Kirsch, whose initial interests focused on organizational planning and 
change, became one of the founding members of the Strategic Management Society in the 
early 1980s. The main aim of his strategy research, which is typical of most German 
endeavours in this field, was to provide a holistic, conceptual-theoretical foundation of 
strategic management, rather than focus on specific aspects of strategy. After experimenting 
with a range of different theoretical perspectives (for example, the perspectives of March and 
Simon 1958, Lindblom 1965, Etzioni 1968), he started exploring the potential of Jürgen 
Habermas‘s theory of communicative action (1984), which has since become the primary 
theoretical basis of the ―Munich School‖. Kirsch drew primarily on Habermas‘s concept of 
the ―lifeworld‖ as the shared cognitive and communicative horizon of our everyday life, 
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within whose scope we experience and interpret the world (for other German researchers who 
have experimented with Habermas‘s theory in strategy research see e.g. Steinmann and 
Schreyögg 1990 or Wüthrich 1991). While Habermas himself originally considered 
corporations as places dominated by systemic rationalities that have driven out the lifeworld, 
Kirsch and his school argued that Habermas‘s view of corporations was exaggerated and 
simplistic (Kirsch 1990, Kirsch and Knyphausen 1993).  
 
Overall, the Munich School‘s approach to strategy has four characteristic aspects, which we 
will present in more detail below: (1) the systematic differentiation between the internal and 
external perspective, (2) the integration of strategies as a separate element of the 
organizational lifeworld, (3) the conceptualization of the ―ongoing process‖ as the primary 
location of the genesis of strategies and (4) the exploration of alternative forms of rationality. 
 
Based on Habermas‘s concept of the lifeworld, the Munich School differentiates 
systematically between two complementary approaches to strategic phenomena: the internal 
and the external perspective (Knyphausen 1988, Kirsch 1991). Observing an organization 
from outside allows one to observe patterns of behaviour that constitute strategic manoeuvres 
(e.g. a company‘s merger with another company or its entry into a new market), yet, whether 
these strategic manoeuvres are intended or not cannot be established from outside. In order to 
understand what really drives such actions, i.e. the real strategy, one needs to switch to the 
internal perspective and take part in the ―lifeworld‖ of an organization and its members. Only 
from within it is possible to capture the intentions that underlie specific actions. Whether or 
not these strategies lead to particular manoeuvres is another question. 
  
In order to relate the notion of strategy to the concept of the lifeworld, Kirsch developed the 
concept further (1991), adding strategies (defined as programmatic orientations) to the 
original components: personality (the cognitive and psychological structures of individuals), 
institutional order (the system of norms and roles that are taken for granted), and culture (the 
reservoir of interpretative schemas). Strategies stand in a recursive relation to the other three 
elements: on the one hand, new strategies typically emerge from personality, institutional 
order and/or culture, as these three elements form the context for thinking and acting within 
the organization. On the other hand, new strategies, if effective, will be sedimented into the 
three other elements affecting and thus changing them (Kirsch 1996). 
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A further consequence of focusing on the lifeworld is that the decision-making process ceases 
to be regarded as the primary location of the strategy-formation process (Obring 1992, Kirsch 
1996). More specifically, while episodes of decision-making might produce strategy 
formulations, i.e. strategy documents, these are not of primary interest. Instead, the focus is on 
the development and change of strategic orientation as an element of the lifeworld. This 
requires reflections about the underlying orientations of action, this would typically take place 
in the ongoing process of organizational activities, rather than in the abstract contexts of 
strategic decision episodes. Strategic decision processes are not treated as irrelevant, but their 
influence on strategy is regarded as more indirect: they can merely trigger reflections in the 
ongoing process but not determine the outcome. Strategy formation, in this sense, is more of a 
by-product of decision-making. 
 
Finally, the influence of Habermas can be seen clearly in the way that the concept of 
rationality is treated in the theory. In line with Habermas, Kirsch (1990, 1991, 1996) puts 
forward a communicative notion of rationality. According to this, rationality manifests itself 
in the way in which validity claims are raised and substantiated in communicative actions. 
Thereby, three different types of validity claims are distinguished: the claims of theoretical 
truth, of normative rightness, and of expressive truthfulness. While the first type of validity 
claim corresponds to a cognitive-instrumental form of rationality (i.e. the claim that 
propositions are correct or that teleological actions are effective), the other two correspond to 
moral-practical and aesthetic-expressive forms (i.e. the claim that the norms underlying one‘s 
actions are right, and the claim that the opinions and wants expressed are authentic 
respectively). According to Kirsch, different organizational lifeworlds exhibit different 
degrees of rationalization. Some lifeworlds are dominated by purely cognitive-instrumental 
rationality. Yet, the more progressive (in a Habermasian sense) the lifeworld, the greater the 
importance of other forms of rationality compared to the cognitive-instrumental one. In other 
words, it becomes legitimate to reflect on and discuss the various normative and aesthetic 
dimensions of different strategic orientations. In order to enable such communicative 
rationalities to come to bear, organizations have to allow enough space for ideal-speech 
situations, which are free of attempts of dominating each other. 
 
Kirsch discusses the different components of his theory of strategy with regard to a more 
general interest in the evolution of organizations in their societal contexts and the possibilities 
of shaping that evolution. Thereby, organizations are conceptualized as being embedded into 
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a wider, societal ―ecology of ideas‖ (Bateson 1972), and emerging and developing in the 
mutual observations between the different actors within and around the organization (e.g. 
employees, competitors, suppliers, customers, consultants, academics). The mutual 
observations lead to an evolutionary dynamic that is beyond the direct control of any of the 
actors involved. In this sense, all actors, including the organization, are faced with a ―radically 
open future‖ (Kirsch 1991, Seidl and van Aaken 2008) in the sense that the world develops in 
ways that go beyond the presently given cognitive and communicative categories. In view of 
that, Kirsch (1991, 1996) argues that strategic management faces the dilemma of being 
supposed to plan into the future, while at the same time being at the mercy of evolutionary 
dynamics. This requires a concept of strategic management as ―planned evolution‖ (Kirsch 
1990, 1997), which combines evolutionary incrementalism with a more comprehensive long-
term plan. 
 
3. Niklas Luhmann and German strategy research 
 
Besides the body of scholarly works that have been drawing on Habermas, there is another 
strong research tradition in strategy that mobilized the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann 
(1973, 1995 [originally 1984], 2000). In contrast to the former, this strand of research is not 
the output of a single school but has sprung from a number of universities. One of the first to 
explore the potential of Luhmann‘s work in strategy research was the school of Horst 
Steinmann and his disciple Georg Schreyögg, who wanted to contribute to the development of 
a ―general theory of strategic management‖ (Schreyögg 1984, p. v). Drawing on the 
complexity approach of the early Luhmann (1973), before his ―autopoietic turn‖, Schreyögg, 
and later Steinmann (Schreyögg 1984, Steinmann and Schreyögg 1986a, Schreyögg and 
Steinmann 1987), conceptualized organizations as systems that operate on the basis of lower 
complexity than their environment. In other words, organizations react selectively to their 
environment. Against this background, the role of strategic management is conceptualized as 
one of selection, i.e. selecting from the multitude of possibilities that the environment 
presents. Selection typically takes the form of strategic planning, which is conceived as an 
―ambiguity-reducing selective process of filtering and processing information through which 
organizations are provided a clear and a workable scheme for taking action‖ (Schreyögg and 
Steinmann 1987, p. 94). While selection is necessary for the organization to be able to operate 
at all – otherwise the organization would be paralyzed by complexity – it poses at the same 
time a potential threat, the so-called ―selection risk‖ (Steinmann and Schreyögg 1986a, p. 
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747). Selection might obstruct the observation of and reaction to crucial events in the 
environment that could endanger the survival of the organization. As a consequence, the 
second role of strategic management is strategic control, as ―a counter-balancing activity to 
strategic planning and the question of whether or not the strategic plans are still valid‖ 
(Schreyögg and Steinmann 1987, p. 94). This concept of strategic control differs 
fundamentally from the conventional notion of strategic control as a secondary function 
involving simply checks on whether performance is in accordance with plans. Schreyögg and 
Steinmann explain: 
 
Guaranteeing the survival of a system requires a continuous process of both selection and 
checking to see if this selection is going to work. The reason for this is simple: creating a greater 
clarity and order (selection) is merely a way of handling environmental ambiguity, and not a 
way of removing it. However well designed the handling mechanism, ambiguity continues to be 
a threat to the system. […] To repeat: the problem of systems survival cannot be conceived 
merely as a problem of selection, as is often done in cognitive psychology (Weick 1979), at the 
heart of the matter is the duality of selection and compensation. (Schreyögg and Steinmann 
1987, p. 94) 
 
The duality of selection (planning) and compensation (control) is a very delicate one as the 
two functions tend to contradict each other: while planning means a selective exclusion of 
possibilities (i.e. reduction of complexity), control means the re-inclusion of the excluded 
possibilities (i.e. increase in complexity). How this dilemma is dealt with in organizations 
becomes a central question in strategic management. Schreyögg and Steinmann explore 
different answers to this question both conceptually (Steinmann and Schreyögg 1986a) and 
empirically (Steinmann and Schreyögg 1986b). In particular, they are interested in how the 
conflicting functions can be combined within the same organization without dissolving it or 
paralyzing it. 
 
One aspect of their work that has received particular attention is the question of how to survey 
the environment for potential signs that the strategic plans (selections) are no longer adequate. 
Steinmann and Schreyögg (1986) point out the problem that one does not know and cannot 
know what to look for and where to look for it. This problem is a variant of the search 
paradox – the Menon paradox, named after the interlocutor of Plato in the famous Menon 
dialogue (the search for something new is in inherently paradoxical, in the sense that one 
cannot know where to search for it, precisely because it is new). The act of scanning needs at 
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least some focus and direction. One needs to but cannot know in which direction to scan. 
Moreover, concentrating in one particular direction of perception implies disregarding others. 
The narrower the focus of perception, the greater the danger of failing to see important signs. 
What befits such situations, argue Schreyögg and Steinmann (1985), is what they term 
―ungerichtete strategische Überwachung‖ – unfocused strategic control. This is paradoxical 
because every observation is selective, that is to say, directed to or focused on something, at 
least to a certain degree. So, Schreyögg and Steinmann‘s request is similar to being urged to 
keep your eyes wide shut. ―Unfocused monitoring‖ is an oxymoron. Addressing this issue, 
Schreyögg and Steinmann write: 
 
At first glance the idea of an unfocussed control mode seems paradoxical and 
impractical. How does one control if there is no defined control object? (Schreyögg and 
Steinmann 1987, pp. 97–98) 
 
They argue that, in a strange way, in the case of unfocused control the typical logic of control 
is reversed. In other control activities one has a definite point of reference (e.g. the 
implementation targets of a plan), according to which something unspecified (e.g. the current 
level of implementation) is evaluated. In the case of unfocused control, however, it is the 
unspecified (i.e. the potential threat to the survival of the organization) that is used as a point 
of reference for evaluating the specified, i.e. the strategic plan (Steinmann and Schreyögg 
1986a, p. 750). This paradox, however, is resolved through time: unfocused control works on 
the basis of ―wait and see‖ (Steinmann and Schreyögg 1996a, p. 750). In given moments, 
concrete signs of crisis might emerge that can be used as specific points of reference for 
evaluating a strategic plan. 
 
While Schreyögg and Steinmann drew mainly on the early work of Luhmann, there were 
others who explored particularly Luhmann‘s later work on autopoietic systems (1986, 1995 
[originally 1984]). The first to do so was Dodo zu Knyphausen (1988), who was also a 
member of the Munich School, and who tried to combine the perspectives of Luhmann and 
Habermas. Knyphausen (1988, 1991, 1992) starts out with the observation that at the heart of 
strategic management is the generation of novelty – new visions, new strategies and so on. 
Yet, a look at the literature in strategic management reveals that the generation of novelty is 
not adequately explained. Conventional approaches to strategy cannot capture the generation 
of novelty as it constitutes a paradox: if something is new, it is not derived from something 
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that already exists (otherwise it wouldn‘t be new), but if it is not derived from something that 
already exists, it cannot come into existence (otherwise it would have emerged from nothing). 
Knyphausen (1988) perceives Luhmann‘s theory as a particularly suitable theoretical 
framework for strategic management as it can capture such paradoxes. Drawing on Luhmann, 
he argues that the paradox of the generation of novelty can be resolved theoretically by 
designing the theory in such a way that it allows switching between perspectives: the systems 
perspective, which treats the organization as a self-reproducing (autopoietic) system, and the 
action perspective, which highlights the communicative contributions of individual members 
(allopoietic). Knyphausen writes: 
 
The genesis of novelty is the result of a continuous back-and-forth between an inside and an 
outside perspective, a back-and-forth between the input of the subject (the individual) and the 
intersubjective communication in the context of a social system. (Knyphausen 1992, p. 153, our 
translation) 
 
In other words, in order to capture the central aspect of strategy, i.e. novelty and change, 
Knyphausen proposes a new theory that is based on an oscillation between a systems 
approach and an action approach. 
 
While Knyphausen did not develop his systems-theoretical approach much further, later on 
Seidl and his colleagues (Hendry and Seidl 2003, Seidl 2005, Jarzabkowski and Seidl 2008, 
MacIntosh et al. in print) picked up on this initial research question, i.e. the explanation of the 
generation of novelty. Although those later studies drew on Luhmann‘s theory as well, they 
addressed the question slightly differently. Rather than proposing a theoretical approach that 
involves a continuous back-and-forth between a systems perspective and an action 
perspective, they drew on Luhmann‘s concept of episode (1990, 1995) as a way of resolving 
the paradox. An episode is a sequence of events structured in terms of its beginning and 
ending, e.g. meetings or away-days. Such episodes allow organizations to routinely suspend 
their normal routine structures of discourse and communication, and in this way create the 
opportunity for reflexive strategic practice. Metaphorically speaking, episodes constitute 
temporary islands within the organization, which provide opportunities for stepping out of 
organizational routines and reflecting on them as if from outside. In this way, alternatives to 
the established strategic orientation become available, which can then be fed into the 
organizational processes and thus initiate strategic change.  
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Taking the research question a step further, Seidl (2007) used a Luhmannian perspective to 
discuss the possibilities for introducing strategic novelty and change from outside the 
organization. Based on Luhmann‘s concept of autopoietic communication-systems, the author 
argues that the field of strategy should be conceptualized as being fragmented into a multitude 
of autonomous discourses, different companies, different consulting firms, different business 
schools and so on. As a consequence of this autonomy, no transfer of meaning between the 
different discourses is possible. This has significant implications for the way in which 
strategic management is perceived. In particular, it makes necessary a re-conceptualization of 
what we mean when we say that an organization ―adopts‖ a new strategy concept, such as 
TQM or core competences. Because of the incommensurability of the different strategy 
discourses, organizations cannot draw on general strategy concepts. Instead, any strategy 
concept that is used within a particular organization has to be understood as the organization‘s 
own product. At most, strategy discourses might ―perturb‖ or ―stimulate‖ each other but there 
cannot be any kind of direct input. Seidl writes in this respect: 
 
Strategy concepts developed and propagated in other discourses (e.g. in a consulting discourse 
or in a business school) can stimulate organizations to develop their own strategy concepts in 
response, but they can never enter the organization as such (Luhmann 2000, 2005). 
Consequently, what appears as the adoption of a general strategy concept would have to be 
treated as an illusion based on the fact that organizations use the same labels, or sets of labels, 
for their own constructs. (Seidl 2007, p. 206) 
 
The transfer of such labels from one discourse to another is associated with a change of the 
meaning behind the labels. When introducing a new label from outside, the organization – 
usually inadvertently – re-interprets the meaning of the label according to its own 
communication logic and in this way creates a new strategy concept. This phenomenon is 
described as ―productive misunderstanding‖ and constitutes ―the way out of this paradox‖ 
(Teubner 2000, p. 408). In that respect, the original strategy concept is misunderstood but this 
misunderstanding is productive in the sense that it leads to the creation of something new. 
 
4. The Austrian School and German strategy research 
 
German strategy research paid keen attention to the concepts of and debates about the 
resource-based/knowledge-based/competence-based view of strategic management. Some 
recent publications attest this in particular: the yearbook for strategic competence 
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management, edited by leading German researchers in this area (Freiling and Gemünden 
2007, Freiling et al. 2008, Proff et al. 2009), as well as the series ―Strategisches 
Kompetenzmanagement‖ (―strategic competence management‖), which was launched in 2008 
(first volume: Eisenkopf et al. 2008) as part of the Gabler Edition Wissenschaft (the science 
imprint of the most important German publishing house for management and business 
administration). 
  
The most recent development is the attempt of Jörg Freiling and colleagues to establish a 
competence-based theory of the firm, founded on market process theory, as developed by 
Mises (1949), Hayek (1978), and Kirzner (1973). In 1992, Jacobson already suggested that 
strategy research should be included in the framework of Austrian market process theory in 
order to account for change, uncertainty, and disequilibrium. In a similar vein, Foss (1993, 
1996, Foss and Ishikawa 2007) built upon Austrian economics. Freiling et al. (2008) have 
written extensively about strategy research and a theory of the firm that is built on the 
philosophy of science and in particular on a Lakatosian framework. Their proposal is to 
transform the cornerstones of competence-based views of the firm into a hard core on the 
basis of Lakatos‘s ideas (1970). These cornerstones, according to Freiling et al. (2008, p. 
1147)
2
, are (1) an economic framing, with (2) economic agents ―equipped with scarce and in 
many cases not perfectly mobile factors (Barney 1991)‖ (Freiling et al. 2008, p. 1147), (3) 
incomplete, asymmetric information, (4) learning that results in idiosyncratic capabilities, (5) 
organizational path dependencies (―history matters‖), (6) heterogeneous, unique bundles of 
factors created through specification processes in the sense of Penrose (1959) and (7) leeway 
for entrepreneurial action, in spite of a constraining business environment. In order to prove 
that their competence-based theory of the firm is compatible with Austrian economics and 
market process theory, Freiling et al. (2008, pp. 148–149) suggest the following six hard-core 
elements (HCEs): 
 
 HCE 1: Subjectivism (differences between economic agents in terms of knowledge, 
motivation, expectations and abilities/skills, which induce asymmetries or underlie the 
idiosyncratic nature of the firm) 
 HCE 2: radical uncertainty 
                                                 
2
 In what follows we deal mainly with this article which is the most recent one. See, however, already Freiling 
(2001), (2004), (2005), Sanchez, Freiling (2005), moreover: Simon et al. (2008). These contributions address, 
among others, issues such as competence-based management, marketing, co-location, and internationalization. 
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 HCE 3: methodological individualism (including an understanding of entrepreneurship 
in the sense of Mises [1949, p. 246]: every member of a firm is/should be able to 
perform entrepreneurial functions – to be what is now called an ―intrapreneur‖) 
 HCE 4: ―homo agens‖ (economic agents as proactive players, permanently looking 
for new opportunities) 
 HCE 5: moderate voluntarism (agents have some, though restricted, impact on their 
environment) 
 HCE 6: time matters (historicity implies possible irreversibilities, path-dependencies, 
and lock-ins, as well as lock-outs, asset mass efficiencies and the like). 
 
The authors claim that these elements make it possible to avoid or overcome the tautology 
problem that the resource-based/competence-based view of strategic management entails 
(Priem and Butler 2001). This problem is known to arise when the competitiveness of a firm 
is attributed to its idiosyncratic resources/competencies and at the same time these very 
resources/competencies are identified as the source of competitive advantages. Freiling et al. 
(2008, p. 1150) claim that they avoid this inherent tautology by concentrating on explaining 
an organization‘s ―striving for competitiveness‖. For Freiling, competitiveness (2004, p. 33) 
consists of competences, i.e. the ability to prove oneself in market processes with customers 
and suppliers (vertical level) and to withstand the competitive forces of rivals in the market 
(horizontal level), in other words, to overcome the opposition of the market-based view on the 
one hand, and the resource-based view on the other. ―Striving to avoid tautological reasoning 
[...] CbTF‘s [Competence-based Theory of the Firm] epistemological aim is therefore the 
explanation of current and future firm competitiveness due to inhomogeneous availability of 
competences and resources.‖ (Freiling et al. 2008, p.1151) Significantly, here the authors 
define resources or competences without reference to competitive success and in this way 
avoid tautological reasoning: ―In particular, it is not necessarily the case that the activation of 
competences guarantees success in the market process‖ (Ibid.). 
 
In our view, this approach has certain remarkable characteristics: 
(1) It is a robust attempt to develop a theory of the firm based on a concept of 
entrepreneurship as strategic management that is characterized by alertness in making use of 
and paying attention to the resources and competences of the firm. 
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(2) It emphasizes the dynamic character of these resources and competences. These are 
grasped as a potential modified/improved/enlarged by and through its actualization and other 
ways of organizational learning. 
(3) It claims that it adds a ―missing chapter‖ to market process theory, a chapter concerning 
intra-organizational process and locating the competence-based theory of the firm in 
management and organization theory. 
(4) In this volume Powell, Rahman and Starbuck explore the theme of competitive advantage 
in 19
th
 and 20
th
 century economics and the intellectual genealogies of the contemporary 
strategic management discourse. They distinguish three views of competitive advantage
3
: the 
industrial economics‘ view focussing on market positions (Porter), the resource-based view 
putting the emphasis on intangible resources (Penrose) and competences, and the evolutionary 
(Schumpeterian) view stressing entrepreneurial innovation. Freiling and colleagues make an 
attempt to combine the latter two of these views. The New Austrian Economics, they argue,  
―deals with trial and error processes resting upon entrepreneurship, knowledge and skills 
(such as alertness) as the cutting edge in competition‖ (Freiling et al. 2008: p.1155). The 
German authors add that their theory, however, ―goes one step further and addresses the 
aligned interplay of skills by the competence construct‖ (ibid.). This conceptualization is in 
line with Jacobson (1992). In a way it entails a paradox: either the economic development and 
market processes are subject to evolution (i.e. to selection processes that are independent of or 
beyond the intentions, plans and designs of homo agens), or the rationality, competence, 
alertness of homo agens is decisive. In this respect, the attempt of Freiling et al. intends to 
overcome oppositions widely taken as insuperable. 
(5) It proposes that a fertile ambience provided by the firm is a decisive factor, which explains 
the existence and the nature of the firm. This, in our view, is the authors‘ most important and 
most original message, as this factor transcends structures, routines, and competences: the 
―firm offers an ‗ambience‘, consisting of stability, reliability, and tight asset and resource 
couplings, nurturing competence building and leveraging‖ (Freiling 2004, p. 35). The 
ambience is effective because 
 
The firm as a stable institution ties entrepreneurial forces together and helps to overcome 
individual mental barriers. [...] Paths can be created or opened up by pooling ideas and other 
kinds of assets within the scope of the firm. (Freiling et al. 2008, p. 1158) 
                                                 
3
 Note that all the three views, as shown by Powell and colleagues, in some way or other go back to Austrian 
(Viennese) economists such as Carl Menger, Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Ludwig Mises and 
Friedrich A. Hayek. 
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Issues such as tacit knowledge, mutual understanding, grammars of routines, intrinsic 
motivation and ―social complexity‖ (Barney 1991) are also important in this context, as they 
―explain why firms can be a preferred institutional mode‖ (ibid., p. 37). Depending on a 
firm‘s ambience, transferring knowledge may be either difficult or quite easy. The 
―stickiness‖ of knowledge and the firm‘s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) are 
functions of the firm‘s ambience. Not only contracts, but also such elements as tacit 
agreements, trust, and commitment are important, all of which transcend a narrow economic 
perspective. To introduce the concept of ambience into a competence-based theory of the firm 
means that sociological reasoning has to be included in economic and management theory. In 
that respect, the theory of Freiling et al. differs from that of Foss, who adheres to a more 
narrow economic perspective.  
 
5. Anthony Giddens and the German strategy research 
 
In Germany, certain authors have tried to use Anthony Giddens‘s structuration theory as a 
basis for a theory of strategic management, as Richard Whittington or Paula Jarzabkowski 
have done in the United Kingdom. Albrecht Becker (1996) examined strategic decision-
making and the supposed rationality of strategic planning with reference to structuration 
theory. Ortmann and Zimmer (1996) dealt with what they called ―recursive regulation‖ – the 
strategic influence that big firms and their associations exert on legislation, politics, regulation 
bodies and their regulatory measures. The idea is that firms do not tend to look on passively 
while legislative bodies or regulation commissions structure (enable or restrict) their action 
fields but try to influence these bodies, or, in other words, try to ―regulate‖ these regulations. 
Recursive regulation is dealt with as an important, though often neglected part of strategic 
management. A reader edited by Ortmann and Sydow (2001) offers an overview of German 
contributions to strategic management that draw on structuration theory. Duschek (2001a) 
elaborates on Giddens‘s concept of modalities in his discussion of ―modalities of strategic 
management‖. Other authors emphasize the strategic management of inter-firm networks 
(Duschek et al. 2001, Sydow 2001) and ―cooperative core competencies‖ (Duschek 2001b). 
The concept of recursive regulations is developed in more depth by Zimmer (2001a, 2001b). 
Ortmann and Sydow (2001, pp. 421-447) suggest that structuration theory should be used as a 
kind of meta-theory so as to reduce to some degree the much lamented diversity of paradigms 
in organization and management theory. They maintain that structuration theory can 
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potentially integrate well-known oppositions such as (1) action and structure, (2) strategy 
content and process, (3) the market-based vs. the resource-based view (4) resources and their 
services à la Penrose (1959), and (5) signification and legitimation – what Mintzberg et al. 
(1999) call the ―cognitive‖ and the ―cultural‖ school of strategic management, respectively. 
Basic concepts such as ―reflexive monitoring of action‖, ―unintended consequences‖, and 
―unrecognized conditions of action‖ are considered to provide valuable elements to every 
analysis of strategic management.  
 
One further development of structuration theory is ―strategy-as-practice‖, which has been 
tackled by Richard Whittington and his colleagues (see e.g. Whittington in print), Paula 
Jarzabkowski (e.g., 2003) and others and which will be the topic of the forthcoming 
Cambridge Handbook of Strategy-as-Practice (Golsorkhi et al. 2010, see also Jarzabkowski‘s 
and Kaplan‘s contribution in this volume). Strategy-as-practice has also attracted the attention 
of German structuration theorists (see, e.g. Jarzabkowski et al. 2007, Rasche 2008, Ortmann 
2010a, 2010b). Ortmann, however, has been somewhat critical of the concepts of action, 
praxis, and practices, which according to him need further elaboration. To that end, 
interactions can be regarded as gesture-response chains, as Ralph Stacey (2001) suggests: 
―Every gesture is a response to some previous gesture, which is a response to an even earlier 
one, thereby constructing history‖ (Stacey 2001, p. 79). To interact means to respond and 
receive a response, more to the point of strategic management, it means to respond to the 
challenges that rivals, customers, risks and opportunities pose. 
 
Manfred Moldaschl (2006), referring to Giddens‘s distinction of rules and resources, argues 
vividly that concepts such as competence, capabilities, and knowledge, all of which are said to 
be factors of competitive advantages, should not be used tautologically. He prefers a more 
rule-based (rather than competence-based) concept of institutional reflexivity to account for 
strategic innovations.  
 
Another complex analyzed by means of structuration theory is (strategic) controlling and 
accounting. Becker (2003) focused on controlling and management accounting practices, 
distinguishing two aspects: reflexive monitoring and rationalization of organizational action. 
More precisely, he analyzed controlling, accounting, and devices such as the balanced 
scorecard in the three dimensions of the social, borrowed from Giddens: signification, 
domination, and legitimation. 
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In the most recent contribution Ortmann (2010a) conceptualizes strategy formation as a 
specific kind of structuration. Strategies, in this view, are temporary, short-lived rules (and 
distributions of resources) with long-term reference. The reason they are short-lived is that the 
life span of strategies is short, compared to that of other organizational rules. Rules 
determined by strategies concern the behaviour of the firm and its members with relation to 
the future and/or the environment. Rules are determined here as ―generalizable procedures of 
praxis‖ (Giddens 1984, pp. 20–21). Strategy formation, then, is the structuring of present and 
future action in order to do justice to expected future events and/or to take into account the 
possible actions and manoeuvres of others – competitors, customers, co-operators, the state 
and other individual or corporate actors in the environment. 
 
In the light of the above, it is possible to overcome the opposition of structure and strategy. 
First, both, strategy and structure are now understood as kinds of structure. Second, instead of 
having to choose between either ―strategy follows structure‖ or its reverse, these supposedly 
exclusive alternatives are now considered to be linked in a recursive circle. Structures in the 
traditional meaning – long-lived organizational structures with short-term reference – not only 
follow, but also are followed by strategies (see Figure 1). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The insight that structures, in the traditional sense, not only follow, but also determine or 
influence strategies – e.g., determining information channels, conflicting interests, 
responsibilities, decision-making powers, and the ―micro-politics of strategy formulation‖ 
(Narayanan and Fahey 1982) – is not new.4 However, within structuration theory it can 
become clarified, and therefore better comprehended, as a kind of recursive constitution of 
structures through strategies and vice versa. 
 
This approach overcomes the opposition of strategy and structure, as well as that of ―planning 
vs. flexibility‖, which are often identified as two diametrically different means for dealing 
with the uncertainty of the future. To achieve this, it introduces a comprehensive concept of 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Aharoni (1966), Bower (1970a, 1970b), Miles and Snow (1978), Gabele (1979), Hall and Saias 
(1980), Gaitanides (1985), for a comprehensive synopsis, see Schreyögg (1984). 
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responsiveness as a decisive competence of strategic management into the theory. 
Responsiveness, in this sense, includes (1) perceptive faculty, (2) sensitive reactions, and (3) 
responsibility with respect to ―the others‖. Within organizations, responsiveness means to be 
prepared to listen to the ―voice‖ in the sense of Hirschman (1970) and to respond 
appropriately. Being responsive to the environment, on the other hand, may mean being open 
to advice and customer complaints, or willing to communicate (Freiling 2005, p. 146). 
Responsiveness is necessary in strategic planning and involves what Ansoff (1984) called 
―flexible response‖. Emphasizing the element of time in distinguishing strategy (short-lived, 
long-term reference) and structure (long-lasting, short-term reference), , allows defining 
planning and flexibility not as exclusive alternatives but as (1.) a matter of graduality and (2.) 
as complementary means of dealing with uncertainty. 
 
6. Jacques Derrida and the German strategy research 
 
Giddens‘s concept of structuration is indebted to Jacques Derrida‘s idea of différance. 
Although later on Giddens was very critical of Derrida (Giddens 1987), he once postulated 
that ―the theory of the structuration of social systems should be based upon [a] threefold 
connotation of différance‖ (Giddens 1979, pp. 45–46). In Giddens‘s concept of structuration, 
however (1984), Derrida‘s thinking became invisible (though not ineffective). 
 
A central aspect of interest in the Derridian stream of strategy research is the concept of rules 
and their application, which are seen as instances of différance (Ortmann 2003a). This is 
because following rules is about iteration and iterability. The idea that rules self-deconstruct 
in and through praxis means that the application of rules, which is traditionally thought to 
derive from rules, is, in a sense, constitutive of the meaning of the rule To use Derrida‘s term, 
the application of rules is a dangerous supplément (i.e. supplement and/or substitute). 
Application means to fulfil, supplement, or substitute the rule. This implies that following 
rules entails necessarily deviating from those rules – though imperceptible in ―normal‖ cases. 
As Heraclitus put this paradox of iteration: ―One cannot step into the same river twice.‖ 
Différance means a differing and deferring force.
5
 
                                                 
5
 See also Dupuy (1994). Another aspect of Derrida‘s thinking that space does not allow us to deal with here, 
although it is highly relevant in our context, is his reflection on the paradoxality of making decisions, especially 
strategic decisions. Strictly speaking, this is a paradox of reasoning. When one is required to make a strategic 
decision, one needs to provide convincing or even compelling reasons, which are, however, usually missing. 
Moreover, one needs ―reasons for reasons‖, which leads to an infinite regress. For more details, see Ortmann 
(2003a, 2003b). 
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From this perspective, strategies are considered to be specific sets of rules and resources, 
namely rules concerning the behaviour of firms and their members, with regard to the future 
and/or the environment. What can be said about rules and their application in general also 
applies to strategies and their realization in practice as well. Ortmann and Salzman (2002) 
analyzed the ―emptiness, fullness and recursiveness of strategic management‖ in terms of 
deconstruction, à la Derrida. The central idea is that strategies are characterized by a certain 
necessary emptiness that has to be filled by and through translating them into action. Several 
researchers have explored this stream, including, for instance, Khurana (2001) and Simon 
(2001) who were particularly concerned with strategic management consulting. 
 
Much of what is described above forms the background to Andreas Rasche‘s ambitious 
attempt (2008) to deconstruct basic concepts of strategic management. His intention was not 
merely to deconstruct theoretical texts, but to show strategic management in practice as being 
always in a process of deconstruction. Rasche, building on Pettigrew‘s distinctions between 
strategy context, process, and content, criticizes the conventional wisdom of strategy research 
and praxis and identifies three dominant logics – the ―necessity of adaptation‖ (strategy 
context), the ―primacy of thinking‖ (strategy process), and the ―fullness of strategic rules and 
resources‖ (strategy content). In doing so, he uncovers the underlying oppositions that reside 
within these dominant logics: environment–organization, formulation–implementation, and 
rules/resources–application.  
 
Rasche maintains that the traditional way of dealing with these oppositions within strategy 
discourse and praxis obscures paradoxalities by privileging one pole in each pair, namely the 
environment, strategy formulation, and rules and resources, as opposed to ―organization‖, 
―implementation‖, and ―application‖. More precisely, the paradox in this case is that the 
environment, regarded as independent of and even opposite to the organization, which is 
supposed to adapt to it, in fact depends on its being enacted by the very organization and its 
strategy. The implementation or realization of a strategy, which is traditionally regarded 
purely as a derivative of its formulation, in fact is constitutive to its meaning, ―constitutive‖ 
possibly in the sense of ―deferring‖/―differing‖, analogously to what has been said above 
about rules/resources and their application. Dealing with these concepts as independent and 
just opposing therefore aims at impossibilities. 
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It is widely thought that deconstruction is concerned mainly with texts, so it may come as a 
surprise that the practical implications of Rasche‘s ideas lead to the concept of strategy-as-
practice (see also Rasche and Chia 2009). Nevertheless, it is not quite as surprising in view of 
his critique of the primacy of thinking and his emphasis on the role of strategy application. In 
particular, he recommends thinking about ―communities of strategy formation‖ as an object of 
strategy research – and, one might add, as an object of organizing or managing strategy 
formation. 
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7. Commonalities in the central streams of strategy research in Germany 
 
In the preceding sections we presented central streams of strategy research in Germany, as 
they have developed over the last few decades. While the cited works are quite different in 
terms of specific research questions, approach and line of reasoning, they share some general 
features, which we will discuss in this section. 
 
A first aspect that is also reflected in the structure of our paper is that the central streams draw 
heavily on grand theories and that they aim at developing more holistic conceptualizations of 
strategic management. The Munich School and the second research stream are based on the 
two eminent German sociologists discussed above, Habermas and Luhmann, who influenced 
significantly the general intellectual debate in Germany in the last decades of the 20th 
century. Similarly, the structurationist and the deconstructivestreams presented here are based 
on Giddens and Derrida, who represent equally fundamental theoretical perspectives. A 
central contribution of each strand of research is, first of all, that strategic issues are framed 
within a particular theoretical perspective. This is obvious especially in the cases of Luhmann 
and Habermas, who were initially hardly noticed outside Germany. The same goes for Derrida 
who has not received any attention in strategy research in the Anglo-Saxon world (apart from 
Clegg et al. 2004). The case of Giddens is somewhat different. There were already scholars 
who had started experimenting with Giddens in strategy when he was picked up in the 
German strategy discourse (e.g. Whittington 1990). Yet, the German research strands did not 
build directly on their work but started out afresh. Giddens was used directly serving as the 
starting point from which research questions sprang and theoretical results were derived. A 
somewhat special case is the stream of strategy research based on the Austrian School. In 
contrast to the other streams, the Austrian School was already quite prominent in strategy 
research (Jacobson 1992) before its ideas were taken up in Germany. This particular 
theoretical perspective had been used in the US for more than a decade before it was taken up 
by the German researchers Freiling and colleagues. While they built directly on existing work 
in the field by colleagues in the US, the focus of their own work was on elaborating the basic 
theoretical concepts of the approach. 
 
A second aspect we should note is the interest in developing general theories of strategic 
management rather than focusing on more specific questions or aspects of strategy. This may 
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reflect the influence of grand theories on the research streams discussed here. All the cited 
streams of strategy research stated that they aimed at developing a general theoretical 
foundation for strategic management. Although there are works outside these principal 
research streams that address more specific points, these are not central to the German 
strategy discourse. The thrust of the German strategy research is clearly conceptual-
theoretical. It is worth mentioning that in all research streams, empirical studies, where 
available, are of rather secondary importance, often merely illustrating the potential of the 
conceptual considerations. 
 
The aspects described so far reflect strongly Galtung‘s characterization (1979, 1981) of the 
Teutonic intellectual style more generally, which we mentioned in the introduction. As 
Galtung (1981) wrote: 
 
It can be maintained that teutonic theory-formation is above all purely deductive. It is guided by 
the basic idea of Gedankennotwendigkeit: if one accepted the premises and certain rules of 
inference, then the conclusion follows. The goal is to arrive from a small number of premises at 
a high number of conclusions covering as vast an area of inquiry as possible. (Galtung 1981) 
 
What can be seen very clearly in this stream is the deductive mode of theorizing, which 
typically starts from a central concept or idea that leads to a pyramidal development of the 
theory. This deductive mode of theorizing is always the same but the central concepts are 
different: lifeworld (Munich School), selectivity of planning or system/environment 
(Steinman-Schreyögg school), the paradox of novelty (Knyphausen, Seidl), the tautology 
problem of competence (Freiling), recursiveness in strategic management (research stream 
based on Giddens‘s ideas), supplement and différance (Ortmann, Rasche). In line with that, 
strategy research tends to be driven by more fundamental questions about organizations rather 
than more narrow questions concerning market competition, which are driving much of the 
North-American strategy research. 
 
This conceptual-theoretical approach in strategy is often combined with reflections on the 
underlying philosophy of science, echoing the general interest in ―paradigm analysis‖, which 
characterizes the Teutonic intellectual style as a whole (Galtung 1981). In the case of Freiling 
and his colleagues, setting the theoretical approach within a Lakatosian framework is even an 
explicit aim of their research. Similar discussions on the philosophy of science can also be 
found in the other four streams covered in this paper. The Munich School, for example (e.g. 
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Kirsch 1996), reflects on the recursive relation between strategy theory and strategy practice, 
and its theoretical underpinnings take the form of an evolutionary theory that co-evolves with 
the development of strategy praxis. The Steinmann-Schreyögg school (Scherer 1995) draws 
particularly on the philosophy of science that is associated with the so-called Erlangen school 
(Lorenzen 1987). Similar reflections, even though less elaborate, can also be found in the 
other streams (e.g. Ortmann and Sydow 2001, Seidl 2007, Rasche 2008). 
 
A further particularity of much of German strategy research concerns the concept of 
rationality. Knyphausen (1995, pp. 268–269) argues that differences in research style between 
Germany and the Anglo-Saxon world are partly the result of particular notions of rationality. 
While Anglo-Saxon research is dominated by notions of cognitive-instrumental rationality, 
alternative concepts of rationality are explicitly discussed in the German research community 
and shape its theoretical developments (e.g. Schreyögg 1984, Kirsch 1991, Becker 1996, Seidl 
and Aaken 2008). German research explores a wide variety of different forms of rationality: 
moral-practical, aesthetic-expressive, occasional, narrative, evolutionary systemic etc. This 
interest in alternative forms of rationality can be seen as a consequence of the general interest 
in fundamental concepts in theory development, which, as mentioned further up is 
characteristic of the Teutonic intellectual style. 
 
A final aspect of the described streams of strategy research is the interest in dilemmas, 
paradoxes and oxymora. Of course, we don‘t want to suggest that thinking in terms of 
paradoxes and making use of oxymora is exclusive to the German strategy discourse – there 
has been a long-standing interest in paradoxes in Anglo-Saxon research as well (see Smith 
and Berg 1987, or Quinn and Cameron 1988). What we want to suggest, however, is that 
German strategy researchers have a certain affinity for this type of thinking. In our description 
of the different research streams we have already highlighted some of the principal paradoxes 
and oxymora. A first example is Kirsch‘s concept of ―planned evolution‖, which tries to 
resolve the dilemma of having to plan into the future, while acknowledging that one cannot 
even conceptualize future developments. A second example is Schreyögg and Steinmann‘s 
concept of ―unfocussed monitoring‖ which is almost an oxymoron. We compared this concept 
to the idea of having your eyes wide shut. . In a sense, the concept of unfocused monitoring is 
meant to bridge the gap between alternative solutions to the problem of dealing with 
uncertainty, which are supposed to be mutually exclusive: either planning or flexibility. A 
third example is Knyphausen‘s and Seidl‘s concern with the paradox of newness, which is 
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dealt with through an oscillation between a systems approach and an action approach, and 
loose coupling of episodes respectively. Seidl (2007) looked closely at the paradox of the 
continuation of meaning between different systems or discourses, which is solved 
theoretically through the concept of ―productive misunderstandings‖. As Teubner – another 
Luhmann scholar – explains: ―Between the discourses [or systems], the continuation of 
meaning is impossible and at the same time necessary. The way out of this paradox is 
productive misunderstanding‖ (Teubner 2000, p. 408).  
 
In the research stream represented by Freiling and his colleagues several paradoxes or 
oxymora are addressed. First of all, Freiling et al. (2008, p. 1160) propose ―to take some steps 
back in order to move forward‖ in theorizing strategy. By this, the authors, as mentioned 
above, mean that one should go back to market process theory and complement it with a 
competence-based view – which in turn can profit from the Austrian School. Market process 
theory takes research ―back to the future‖ of a competence-based theory of the firm, so to 
speak. In addition to that, Freiling and his colleagues are particularly interested in ways of 
reconciling the opposing concepts of market and organization with various concepts like 
intrapreneurship or virtual organizations that consist of networks of firms.  
 
In the case of the Giddensian research stream there are multiple dilemmas that were already 
pointed out by Giddens himself, such as structure vs. action. The authors who follow this 
research stream maintain that structuration theory can be used to deal with many of the much 
lamented oppositions in strategy research, like content and process, market- vs. resource-
based views, and the like. In particular, they argue that to think of strategy formation as 
structuration may help resolve the opposition between strategy and structure. It is probably to 
be expected that in the Derridian research stream many paradoxes and dilemmas are 
discussed. The most far reaching is Rasche‘s project (2008) of ―deconstructing‖ the dominant 
logics of strategy context, process, and content and its underlying oppositions, i.e. 
environments/organization, strategy, formulation/implementation, rules, and resources/ 
application. Derrida‘s message to strategy research is that it should accept its paradoxical 
foundation and challenge its deeply held assumptions, such as ―the primacy of thinking‖. The 
list of examples of paradoxes and oxymora discussed in the context of the central research 
streams could be extended considerably. Yet, our purpose was not to provide a conclusive list 
but merely to demonstrate that researchers in these streams have a particular affinity to 
thinking in paradoxes and oxymora. 
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At this point, it might be worth emphasizing some parallels between the tendencies in German 
research on business strategy, described further up, and the attempt of the Prussian military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz to develop a philosophy of strategy. Although Clausewitz wrote 
about strategy in a military context, his work (1984, originally published in 1832–34) is 
generally considered of much broader relevance – particularly to business strategy (Ghyczy 
and Bassford 2001). Like the authors mentioned earlier, Clausewitz too aimed at developing a 
general theory of (military) strategy rather than focusing on particular aspects. He had a 
holistic perspective, treating strategy in the wider context of politics and political aims, he 
drew on a range of different disciplines, and – not surprisingly, being a contemporary of 
Hegel – had a dialectical approach to reality, taking a particular interest in antithetical 
tensions. Despite Clausewitz‘s prominence, his ideas had hardly any impact on German 
business strategy, and were not taken up by the strategy researchers mentioned further up. 
Yet, the parallels noted here might be no mere coincidence. Instead, one could argue that 
Clausewitz and those strategy researchers share a common root, i.e. the particular ―Teutonic‖ 
intellectual style. 
 
So far we have pointed out the particularities of five important research streams in Germany 
over the last three decades. On the basis of these particularities, strategy research in Germany 
can be seen as quite distinct from mainstream research in the US. In view of this, while other 
researchers like Snow (1986) and McGee and Thomas (1986) come to the conclusion that the 
European perspective on strategy is not very different from that in the US, we would argue 
that the central streams of research in Germany differ significantly from their US 
counterparts. This is in line with Knyphausen‘s earlier conclusion (1995) that German 
strategy research provides alternatives to mainstream strategy research in the US. At the same 
time, however, one has to acknowledge that our review of the literature focused only on 
central streams of strategy research in Germany.  
 
As mentioned above, there are many other works outside the streams described here, which 
are much closer to the North-American mainstream. Furthermore, there are researchers in 
North America who think along similar lines as the German strategy researchers presented in 
this paper, and who have also drawn on grand theories addressing fundamental questions (e.g. 
Hinings and Greenwood 1988), aimed at developing fundamental approaches to strategy (e.g. 
Ansoff 1965), reflected on the philosophy of science underlying their approach (e.g. 
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Shrivastava 1986), been concerned with the concept of rationality (e.g. Gilbert 1992) and with 
paradoxes (e.g. Quinn and Cameron 1988). Yet, we would argue that these aspects are typical 
of research in Germany, while they are the exception, rather than the rule in North America.  
 
We should note, however, that in the course of time, differences between German and Anglo-
Saxon research become less prominent as the boundaries between different styles of research 
start to fade. German researchers increasingly collaborate with their Anglo-Saxon colleagues 
and their publications now reach a more international readership. In addition to that, because 
of international movements towards new forms of accreditation, audit and evaluation there is 
considerable pressure on the established German university system to change (Muller-Carmen 
and Salzgeber 2005). As a consequence, strategy research in Germany is becoming 
increasingly ―Saxonic‖ (Galtung 1981) in style. At the same time, however, there appears to 
be also an opposite trend: the most obvious example of this is the recent rise of the so-called 
strategy-as-practice research tradition (Johnson et al. 2003, Jarzabkowski et al. 2007, 
Golsorkhi et al. 2010) in the UK and slowly in the US as well (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan 
2010), which shares many of the aspects that characterize the German research stream we 
have described here. Perhaps it is not surprising that many German strategy researchers are 
highly involved in the strategy-as-practice community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to identify the particularities of German strategy research that 
distinguish it from US mainstream research, which has always been dominant in this field. 
For our purpose, we examined central streams of strategy research although, admittedly, we 
have not been able to include all strands of current German strategy research. In the process, 
we identified several aspects typical of the central streams: strategy researchers tend to draw 
on grand theories, and especially on the sociological and philosophical traditions associated 
with prominent figures such as Habermas, Luhmann or Giddens. Also, they develop more 
holistic approaches to strategy and are concerned with fundamental questions about 
organizations in their environments. The research itself is predominantly conceptual-
theoretical, and theories are derived deductively from central principles or concepts, which 
reflect the underlying philosophy of science. Furthermore, German researchers are concerned 
with forms of rationality that go beyond the classic cognitive-instrumental form and have a 
particular affinity to thinking in terms of paradoxes and oxymora.  
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While these aspects can also be found in some North American research, in that case they 
tend to be the exception rather than the rule, whereas in German strategy research they play a 
central role. We explained these particularities on cultural grounds, especially the general 
intellectual style of German academia (which has been dubbed the ―Teutonic‖ intellectual 
style, Galtung 1981), the structure of the German academic system (i.e. the Lehrstuhl system), 
and the limited exchange between German researchers and their colleagues from outside 
Germany. Nevertheless, we concluded that, in the light of increasing mobility among 
researchers on an international scale, increasing collaboration between researchers from 
Germany and their colleagues from other countries, institutional pressures on the German 
university system due to new forms of accreditation, audit and evaluation, and an increasing 
focus on publishing for an international readership, the distinctiveness of German strategy 
research is fading. 
 
It goes without saying that this increasing collaboration is desirable. Both sides, German 
strategy research and US mainstream research, can benefit: the former, from the more 
empirical, more rigorous and more down-to-earth orientation of US mainstream research, the 
latter, from the strengths of ―German‖ or ―Teutonic‖ deductive thinking and its inclination 
towards a thoroughly conceptual foundation. Undeniably, however, international cooperation 
goes hand in hand with the international unification of methods and ways of thinking, writing 
and talking, which may threaten the diversity necessary for creativity in strategy research. 
Moreover, there is a discernible danger of losing touch with important philosophical or 
theoretical traditions other than the Anglo-Saxon ones. For instance, many of the German 
students of strategy we dealt with are, in one way or another, knowingly or not, committed to 
the phenomenological tradition which goes back to Edmund Husserl and his concept of 
―Lebenswelt‖ (―life-world‖). This is because Habermas, as well as Luhmann, Giddens and 
Derrida themselves are, in some sense, committed to Husserl‘s work. The approach labelled 
―strategy-as-practice‖ in particular is based on a concept of practice which in part – e.g. in the 
cases of Giddens and Bourdieu – goes back to Husserl but could be significantly elaborated 
through phenomenological thinking and pertinent concepts such as ―relevance structures‖, 
―being-in-the-world‖ or ―entwinement with others and things‖ (see Sandberg and Dall‘Alba 
2009, Ortmann 2010a). Another example is the concept of ―responsiveness‖ noted above: it is 
present within the strategic management discourse (e.g. in Kirsch 1992 and in the ―flexible 
response‖, as expounded by Ansoff 1984) but can benefit considerably from the insights of 
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the German philosopher and phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels. His opus magnum, 
Antwortregister (1994), is about answering and responding (―antworten‖) as an important 
dimension implied by human action – and by ―passion‖ in the sense of suffering or of being 
subject to what happens to one, e.g. to strategists (Ortmann 2010a). There is a considerable 
danger of forfeiting the richness and national diversity of European thinking in the course of 
what we referred to as international ―unification‖. (Needless to say, this applies to, say, 
French or Danish philosophical traditions as well, e.g. to Bergson‘s approach to time or 
Michel de Certeau‘s idea of ―consumption as production of usages‖,6 or to Kierkegaard‘s 
concept of decision, respectively.) Given these entanglements of international collaboration it 
may be appropriate to end with another oxymoron: let‘s live and work apart together! 
  
                                                 
6
 See de Certeau (1988). Ortmann (2003b, pp. 185–209) and Suominen and Mantere (2010) made use of this idea 
in order to conceptualize the practices of strategists and other actors as creative and possibly deviant ways of 
―consuming strategies‖ (see also Whittington 2003, p. 121). We consider this as a more fruitful conception, 
compared to the more deterministic concept of habitus in the sense of Bourdieu. 
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Fig. 1: Strategy and structure: recursive relationship 
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